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INTRODUCTION 
Litigation before national and international courts can aim at 
two different kinds of results: direct effects, which concern the 
 
* Visiting Professor of Law, Central European University. Email: 
pasquale.annicchino@eui.eu. I’m grateful to Andrea Pin, Dmytro Vovk, Christine Venter, 
and Michael Antonov for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I would 
like to thank Miranda Cherkas Sherill and the editorial team of the BYU Law Review for their 
editing and suggestions. All errors remain mine. 
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concrete resolution of the legal dispute at stake; and also indirect 
effects, with the goal of wider social and cultural impact. As argued 
by Dia Anagnostou and Effie Fokas in the case of the European 
Court of Human Rights: 
Indirect effects include the ways in which international human 
rights judgments may influence domestic debates in law, politics 
and academia, raise public consciousness, change how social 
actors perceive and articulate their grievances and claims, 
empower national rights institutions, or prompt mobilization 
among civil society and other rights advocates.1 
The same thing has been argued by Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court. Judges not only resolve disputes, but “teach.”2 To 
this extent, an approach to the study of law that takes into account 
its relationships with social movements can highlight 
characteristics of legal developments that are otherwise not 
considered. Such an approach can be the key to understanding the 
role of law in polarized societies in the context of the culture wars,3 
considering that legal arguments and doctrines contribute to 
cultural understandings of the law and the role of social 
 
 1. Dia Anagnostou & Effie Fokas, The “Radiating Effects” of the European Court of 
Human Rights on Social Mobilisations Around Religion in Europe—An Analytical Frame 2 
(Grassrootmobilise Working Paper No. 1, 2015), http://grassrootsmobilise.eu/the-
radiating-effects-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights-on-social-mobilisations-around-
religion-in-europe-an-analytical-frame/. While the authors focus their attention on the 
European Court of Human Rights, they also mention that “studies show that decisions of 
high profile and authoritative courts like the U.S. Supreme Court prompt individuals to 
clearly elaborate their attitudes on an issue, crystallizing their views for or against the ruling 
and underpinning a broad range of mobilization efforts.” Id. 
 2. According to Laurence Tribe: 
Justice Kennedy’s opinions have repeatedly emphasized the notion that, through 
the decisions it announces and the reasons it offers for those decisions, the Court 
does more than resolve the particular ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ entrusted to it for 
resolution. He has observed: ‘By our opinions, we teach’ . . . [t]he idea that the 
populace at large will actually read the Court’s opinions may seem naive. But if 
one reflects on how those opinions reverberate through both traditional and social 
media outlets, the idea’s innocence may come to be appreciated and even admired 
in time. 
Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 23–24 (2015). 
 3. Christopher McCrudden, Transnational Culture Wars, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 434 
(2015). The development of the concept of dignity in adjudication is also part of a 
transnational exchange. See Steve Sanders, Dignity and Social Meaning: Obergefell, Windsor, 
and Lawrence as Constitutional Dialogue, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2069 (2019); Reva B. Siegel, 
Dignity and Sexuality: Claims on Dignity in Transnational Debates over Abortion and Same-Sex 
Marriage, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 355 (2012). 
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movements in developing the law.4 Discussion on rights, and in our 
case on dignity, can therefore be understood as discursive logic that 
“shape[s] the normative [and political] frames through which 
individual and collective actors conceptualise . . . social 
problems.”5 The aim of this contribution is to assess the role of 
arguments based on human dignity by conservative Christian 
groups in their litigation strategies in leading cases before the  
U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights. 
After the introduction, Part II offers some methodological remarks 
on the study, and Part III discusses the problems concerning the 
definition of dignity and Christian contributions to its definition. 
Part IV discusses the “radiating effects” of litigation; Part V 
analyzes the role played by arguments based on human dignity in 
leading cases before the two courts; and Part VI concludes that,  
in the cases analyzed, arguments based on dignity have only 
played a marginal role. 
I. METHODOLOGY 
This article builds on the work done in the context of three 
European Research Council projects in which I have been involved: 
ReligioWest, Grassrootmobilise, and Postsecular Conflicts.6 I have 
applied some limitations to the selection of cases to be analyzed: 
after mapping relevant cases for the purpose of this study, I limited 
the selection to the last ten years (2010–20). I further limited my 
analysis to five cases per court, for a total of ten cases: five in the 
U.S. Supreme Court and five in the European Court of Human 
Rights. The list of selected cases is provided at the end of this Part 
in a table. This selection of cases permits comparison between the 
two courts. I also decided to select these cases in order to cover 
different topics with direct relevance for the interests of religious 
 
 4. Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH. 
L. REV. 877 (2013). 
 5. Anagnostou & Fokas, supra note 1, at 6. 
 6. Information on these research projects can be found on their respective websites. 




plains’%20in%20the%20army) (last visited Feb. 13, 2021); GRASSROOTSMOBILISE, 
http://grassrootsmobilise.eu/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2021); Postsecular Conflicts, UNIVERSITÄT 
INNSBRUCK, https://www.uibk.ac.at/projects/postsecular-conflicts/ (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2021). 
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groups, religious non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or 
public-interest law firms with strong religious connections. The 
topics selected are same-sex marriage, abortion, collective religious 
freedom, individual religious freedom, and migration. I selected 
these topics as they usually are within the typical domain of actions 
and engagement for religious groups in litigation both in the 
United States and Europe. These cases were also selected based  
on their relevance in scholarly debates. Time does not allow  
for covering all possible cases—that would require a book—but 
these still illuminate relevant trends in litigation on religion and 
human dignity. 
One basic issue to deal with has been the definition of the 
“Christian” or “conservative” legal movement for the purpose of 
this contribution. I think we can use as a working definition the one 
proposed by Daniel Bennett: “multi-issue organization dedicated 
to the interests of Christian conservatives primarily through legal 
strategies and tactics.”7 I do not equate the notion of “Christian” 
with the notion of “conservative.” In litigation we have often seen 
progressive religious groups submitting their arguments before 
different courts. However, for the purpose of this study, I focus 
only on conservative Christian groups as they have been identified 
by different studies as being at the forefront of transnational 
litigation on religion.8 
 




Hodges, 576 U.S. 
644 (2015) 





 7. Daniel Bennett, The Rise of Christian Conservative Legal Organizations, RELIGION & 
POL. (June 10, 2015), https://religionandpolitics.org/2015/06/10/the-rise-of-christian-
conservative-legal-organizations. Bennett lists the following organizations as examples  
in the United States: Alliance Defending Freedom, American Center for Law and  
Justice, Center for Law and Religious Freedom, Liberty Counsel, Liberty Institute,  
National Legal Foundation, Pacific Justice Institute, Thomas More Law Center, and  
Thomas More Society. Id.; see also DANIEL BENNETT, DEFENDING FAITH: THE POLITICS OF  
THE CHRISTIAN CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT (2017); Daniel Bennett, A Match Made in 
Heaven? Linking Christian Legal Advocacy with Conservative Politics, in THE EVANGELICAL 
CRACKUP? THE FUTURE OF EVANGELICAL-REPUBLICAN COALITION 222–38 (Paul A. Djupe & 
Ryan L. Claassen eds., 2018). 
 8. See CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, LITIGATING RELIGIONS: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, COURTS, AND BELIEFS (2018). 
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Russo v. June 
Medical Services 
LLC, 140 S. Ct. 2103 
(2020) 
A, B & C v. Ireland, 
25579/05 (2010) 
Abortion 
Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 
573 U.S. 682 (2014) 
Fernández 





Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018) 




Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 2392 
(2018) 
F.G. v. Sweden, 
43611/11 (2016) 
Migration 
Table 1: List of Selected Cases 
II. WHICH DIGNITY? 
The dignity of the human person has been at the center of  
the movement that promoted universal human rights after the 
Second World War. There are, of course, several intellectual sources 
that have contributed to the development and evolution of the 
notion and relevance of human dignity.9 As explained by Samuel 
Moyn, an important role in this context has been played by the 
Catholic Church: 
The Roman Catholic Church had previously rejected the hitherto 
secular and liberal language of human rights. But now the pope 
turned to it, making human dignity its new basis. Around the 
same time, ecumenical formations of transatlantic Protestant 
elites proclaimed human rights to be the key to future world 
order. The communion between human rights and Christianity 
was therefore a novel and fateful departure in the history of 
political discourse.10 
 
 9. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Christian Dignity and Overlapping Consensus, 46 BYU 
L. REV. 1245, 1249 (2021) (“The idea of dignity was present in antiquity, but the idea  
of Christian dignity arose from theology and social rank in the Middle Ages.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 10. Samuel Moyn, Christian Human Rights: An Introduction, 28 KING’S L.J. 1, 2 (2017). 
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The Catholic Church, and Christian groups in general, have 
often tried to advance their own understandings of human dignity. 
Recently, some scholars have also suggested that religious groups, 
and in particular the Catholic Church, should shift their focus from 
the protection of human rights to the protection of dignity: 
The Catholic Church would be far better able to explain itself, and 
to explain the genuine core radicalism (after some needed 
theoretical pruning) of its positions in these areas, if it consistently 
abandoned rights in favour of dignity and criticized the abuses of 
justice consequent upon the hegemony of rights with respect to 
more political and economic issues also.11 
This phenomenon results from the proliferation of rights and 
the critique of “new rights.” Whether this enterprise will succeed 
will depend on how these arguments are developed and whether 
courts follow this line of reasoning in their adjudication. Religious 
groups, in particular, should always take into account the need to 
develop inclusive notions of dignity in order to avoid forging and 
supporting notions that tend to exclude.12 
It is, however, important to underline that there does not seem 
to be a shared conception of human dignity across different 
jurisdictions and between the two courts13 at the core of this study. 
Moreover, within the same jurisdiction conceptions of dignity seem 
to differ and lack common ground. In the United States, the line of 
jurisprudence primarily influenced by Justice Kennedy that 
ultimately led to Obergefell v. Hodges seems to have been driven by 
the central concern for the dignity of individuals. As Yuvraj Joshi 
has pointed out, initially this line of jurisprudence, from Planned 
 
 11. John Milbank, Dignity Rather Than Rights, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY 
199, 205 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013). 
 12. See generally the critique developed in this issue by Gedicks, supra note 9. 
 13. This is underlined by Paolo G. Carozza:  
[T]here is a practical consensus around a core meaning of human dignity, lesser 
but discernible convergences of understanding around a cluster of key questions, 
values, and circumstances that are related to dignity, and some sharp 
disagreements and even contradictions that reflect not only the variety of 
intellectual and moral traditions in which the concept has its roots but also 
differences in the specific political, social, and cultural contexts in which the very 
broad principle gets instantiated.  
Paolo G. Carozza, Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Human Experience, in UNDERSTANDING 
HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 11, at 615, 619. On the definition of human dignity, see also Mark 
L. Movsesian, Of Human Dignities, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517 (2016). 
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Parenthood v. Casey14 to Lawrence v. Texas,15 focused mainly on 
individual freedom of choice.16 However, this understanding 
started to change in United States v. Windsor17 and Obergefell v. 
Hodges,18 as “[d]ignity veered away from respect for the freedom to 
make personal and intimate choices without interference.”19  
At least two notions of dignity are highlighted in this context. One 
is defined as “dignity as respect”20 and “appeals to a person’s 
freedom to make personal and intimate choices without 
interference.”21 The other understanding of dignity is defined  
as “dignity as respectability” and “appeals to the social 
acceptability and worthiness of the personal choices being  
made and those making them.”22 It is based on this distinction  
that Joshi offers a critique of the Obergefell decision, not from  
a conservative standpoint, as we often have seen, but rather from  
a progressive position: 
It is perhaps ironic that gaining “equal dignity in the eyes of the 
law” requires same-sex couples to establish the same love and 
commitment that the law takes for granted in the case of 
heterosexual couples. But, what is more troubling is overlooking 
that same-sex and unmarried relationships might adopt different 
forms of loving and commitment―and that these different 
intimacies might too be entitled to equal respect and dignity.23 
 
 14. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 15. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 16. Yuvraj Joshi, The Respectable Dignity of Obergefell v. Hodges, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 
117, 117 (2015). 
 17. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 18. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
 19. Joshi, supra note 16. 
 20. Id. at 118. 
 21. Id. at 119. “It gives due regard to her feelings, wishes, and beliefs about personal 
decisions, so that she can make decisions that fulfill her sense of true self and feel a sense of 
personal and social worth from being her true self in public.” Id. 
 22. Id. According to Joshi: 
It affirms decisions because and only insofar as they have and show the qualities 
that are deemed dignified by a normative standard of behavior. This respectable 
meaning of dignity is in deep conflict with the intuitive idea of dignity as respect. 
By demarcating the boundaries of “dignified” choices, it undercuts the freedom to 
make personal and intimate choices without interference. 
Id. 
 23. Id. at 123. The same arguments critical of the reasoning at the basis of the  
decision have been raised by Gregg Strauss, What’s Wrong with Obergefell, 40 CARDOZO  
L. REV. 631 (2018). 
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Are the different doctrinal conflicts on the definition of a shared 
notion of dignity enough to declare the experiment with human 
dignity failed or destined to fail? Litigation before courts can 
further contribute to clarifying the potential of human dignity in 
the living experience of different realities. This does not signify that 
we need a global and Cartesian concept of human dignity that is 
applicable everywhere with the same meaning. It also does not 
signify that the Christian and religious understandings of dignity 
are the only contributions that need to be taken into account in 
further developing such a notion. The concept of human dignity 
has to be understood as the basis of a global effort for the promotion 
and protection of fundamental rights. As Paolo Carozza reminds 
us: “The ontological claim of human dignity helps sustain the very 
possibility of human rights as global principles that can and should 
help us condition sovereignty and hold accountable those who 
abuse power, especially the power of the state.”24 
There seems therefore to be an important role for dignity in 
global and comparative constitutional law, especially in a historical 
period where “rights discourse” is under attack in many countries 
in the world. Work on properly defining and applying human 
dignity also helps us challenge the mainstream narrative of the 
“rights project” as only and necessarily a progressive project. In his 
work, Moyn has challenged this narrative: for him it is impossible 
to understand the development and genesis of human rights 
without a proper analysis of the development of conservative and 
religious thinking. As Moyn has argued:  
[T]he general thesis of my new book, Christian Human Rights, is 
that through this lost and misremembered transwar era, it is 
equally if not more viable to regard human rights as a project of 
the Christian right, not the secular left. Their creation brought 
about a break with the revolutionary tradition and its droits de 
l’homme, or—better put—a successful capture of that language by 
forces reformulating their conservatism.25  
The litigation before courts, and the work on the notion of human 
dignity by several actors, could therefore contribute to a new 
paradigm of rights protection centered on individual and collective 
human dignity. Developing an approach based on dignity could 
also help bring in the conservative legal movement, which does not 
 
 24. Carozza, supra note 13, at 620. 
 25. Moyn, supra note 10, at 5. 
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necessarily have an initial focus on individual human rights and is 
influenced by religious traditions. 
III. LITIGATION AND ITS “RADIATING EFFECTS” 
 Litigation on religious issues has become an important 
phenomenon of our time. As argued by McCrudden, “[o]ne of the 
most obvious features of the landscape of religious litigation has 
been the increasing number of courts that are now open to receiving 
and adjudicating disputes between human rights and religious 
beliefs.”26 In this context, an important role is played by religious 
NGOs and religiously oriented public-interest law firms. 
According to McCrudden, “[t]here is growing evidence that the 
legislative and political role of NGOs, both secular and religious, is 
now being supplemented by an additional role: the initiation and 
conduct of, or participation in, litigation at the domestic level and 
beyond.”27 Among these organizations, NGOs, and public-interest 
law firms litigating before the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
European Court of Human Rights, conservative Christian 
organizations have played an important role. In the United States, 
several studies have highlighted the distinct character of the culture 
of conservative Christian litigation. As Hans J. Hacker has put it, 
“during the 1990s conservative Christian attorneys began to 
present courts with the argument that government sometimes 
penalizes legitimate religious expression in attempting to avoid 
entanglement, and that religious speech should be given the same 
protection from governmental intrusion as any other form of 
protected speech.”28 
As a reaction to the cultural conflicts of the sixties and the 
increasing relevance of progressive ideas in society, religious 
conservatives began to organize in order to guarantee the  
influence of Christian morals and values in the public square  
and public policies: 
They have attempted to fulfill the goal of “reclaiming America” 
by placing primary importance on working within those bastions 
of majoritarianism in American politics—the U.S. Congress, state 
legislatures, and the electoral process. In particular, legislative 
lobbying has held the position of primary importance within the 
 
 26. MCCRUDDEN, supra note 8, at 42. 
 27. Id. at 46. 
 28. HANS J. HACKER, THE CULTURE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN LITIGATION xi (2005). 
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New Christian Right’s overall strategy—the organizations that 
represent conservative Christian interests in Congress have 
always been the best funded, best organized, most highly visible, 
and most aggressive of all the many and varied institutions that 
compose the far-flung movement.29 
In addition to legislative lobbying, litigation before courts have 
been a major part of this effort, where litigation was understood as 
a useful tool to “change the world.”30 As argued by Jay A. Sekulow, 
General Counsel for the American Center for Law and Justice, these 
organizations were not meaning 
to carry the day on the culture with politics alone. Our job is to 
keep [the] avenues open, make sure the church can be the 
church. . . . We are there to make sure the church’s voice is heard. 
Somebody said once we’re Jesus lawyers. Jesus doesn’t need a 
lawyer. But the church does. I believe the church needs 
organizations that will defend the integrity of Christians in the 
public square.31 
After the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of 
Lawrence v. Texas,32 where a decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights was quoted in the majority opinion, some 
conservative Christian organizations began to wonder if the 
Strasbourg Court could be perceived as a threat because of the 
possibility that its precedent could have a persuasive influence on 
the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Therefore, Christian 
conservative religious groups started to litigate in Strasbourg as 
well. Transnational litigation on religious issues is therefore, as we 
have mentioned, characterized by a strong influence from 
American organizations and public-interest law firms.33 As 
McCrudden argues: 
 
 29. Id. at 6 (citation omitted). 
 30. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, TO CHANGE THE WORLD: THE IRONY, TRAGEDY, AND 
POSSIBILITY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE LATE MODERN WORLD (2010). 
 31. HACKER, supra note 28, at 5 (quoting Jay A. Sekulow, General Counsel, Am. Ctr. 
for L. & Just. (1998)). 
 32. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 33. American organizations are now also particularly active in Europe. See Effie Fokas, 
Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Mobilizations in the Shadow of European Court of 
Human Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence, 4 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 54 (2015); see also 
Effie Fokas, Comparative Susceptibility and Differential Effects on the Two European Courts: A 
Study of Grasstops Mobilizations Around Religion, 5 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 541 (2016) 
[hereinafter Comparative Susceptibility]. According to Fokas, “[t]he predominance of the 
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It is a noticeable feature of religious transnational litigation that it 
is, in the main, US conservative NGOs which are at the forefront of 
this development, a phenomenon that warrants a brief 
explanation. After Lawrence, the ECtHR has been a particular 
target for interventions. The largest group of NGOs active before 
the Court is based in the United Kingdom, but the second largest 
group of NGOs comes from the United States, including several 
that are law school clinics, and a significant proportion of that 
group of US NGOs is made up of religious conservative groups.34 
The key role of American organizations has been highlighted 
also by Laura Van den Eynde, who has noticed an increase in third-
party interventions from the United States before the European 
Court of Human Rights over the years.35 As Eugenia Relaño Pastor 
has also argued, the “United States and Canada provide the best 
developed examples of NGO involvement in religious litigation 
and in litigation specifically by religious groups.”36 
An analysis of their interventions before the Courts can help us 
in highlighting if, and to what extent, legal arguments based on 
dignity play a role in their strategic litigation before the judiciary. 
IV. AMICUS BRIEFS AND CHRISTIAN ARGUMENTS BEFORE COURTS 
Christopher McCrudden has already underlined the extent to 
which judicial interpretations of human rights are influenced or 
shape the concept of human dignity.37 McCrudden has also stressed 
how the concept of dignity is often context-specific and depends on 
both the jurisdiction and the timeframe.38 For McCrudden the 
concept of dignity might also generate some problems, given its 
vague and changing notion which might open the way to an 
increase in judicial discretion.39 But have the U.S. Supreme Court 
 
United States in this field of study is not surprising: American society is historically actively 
litigious . . . the US provides one of the best developed examples of NGO and civil society 
engagement in religious litigation and of litigation specifically by religious groups.” 
Comparative Susceptibility, supra, at 547 (citations omitted). 
 34. MCCRUDDEN, supra note 8, at 53. 
 35. Laura Van den Eynde, An Empirical Look at the Amicus Curiae Practice of Human 
Rights NGOs Before the European Court of Human Rights, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 271 (2013). 
 36. Eugenia Relaño Pastor, Christian Faith-Based Organizations as Third-Party 
Interveners at the European Court of Human Rights, 46 BYU L. REV. 1329, 1340–41 (2021). 
 37.  Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655 (2008). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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and the European Court of Human Rights taken dignity into 
account so far? Jean Paul Costa, former President of the European 
Court of Human Rights, has investigated the role and use of human 
dignity in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. First, he noticed the absence of the concept of dignity in the 
text of the Convention,40 but over the years both the European 
Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights began to elaborate an approach to human dignity.41 As Costa 
underlined, many of the cases in which human dignity has played 
a role have been decided under Article 3 of the Convention.42 
Dignity has also played a rule in adjudication before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, as multiple scholars have highlighted.43 It is 
therefore worth asking whether human dignity has played any 
role, if not directly in the decision-making of the Courts, then at 
least in submissions by conservative Christian groups in their 
amicus briefs. This analysis can help to illuminate the supply side 
 
 40. According to Costa, 
[t]he absence of dignity is surprising, the more so if one considers that the text of 
the European Convention is in many respects very close to that of the Universal 
Declaration. . . . It is likely that the drafters nevertheless had the concept of dignity 
in their minds, especially because the very establishment of the Council of Europe 
in 1949 and the elaboration of the Convention, the first treaty prepared within its 
framework, were the work of persons firmly opposed to the atrocities and 
barbarity of the Second World War. 
Jean-Paul Costa, Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in 
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 11, at 393, 394. 
 41. According to Costa, in a report dated December 1973, the Commission addressed 
the issue of human dignity by stating that racial discrimination constitutes a breach of human 
dignity. Costa highlights how “[t]his very first example of the use of the term dignity shows 
that the Commission, and the Court subsequently, have never restricted their recourse to 
dignity solely to Article 3, even if it is the field where it is most frequently applied.” Id. at 
395. For the 1973 report of the Commission mentioned by Costa, see East African Asians v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 4403/70, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 76 (1973). 
 
 
 42. According to Costa, 
[m]any of these cases deal with disproportionate use of physical force against 
people in vulnerable situations, such as people arrested by police or detained in a 
cell. The general principle is that when a person is deprived of liberty, any recourse 
to physical force which is not strictly necessary diminishes human dignity, and is 
in principle an infringement of Article 3. 
Costa, supra note 40, at 396. 
 43. Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 
84 NEB. L. REV. 740 (2006); AHARON BARAK, Human Dignity in American Constitutional Law, in 
HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 185,  
185–208 (2015). 
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of the creation of legal arguments that has also contributed to the 
wider legal culture and development of ideas that shape 
constitutional adjudication. 
A. Same-Sex Marriage 
1. Obergefell v. Hodges  
Holding: The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license 
a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize 
their marriage when it was lawfully licensed and performed out of 
state. Relevant references to dignity in the amicus briefs submitted 
to the Court are available in the table below.44 
 
Organizations Number of References to Dignity 
Ryan T. Anderson 
(Heritage Foundation)45 




One reference. Not central to  
the argument. 
 
 44.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675–76 (2015). 
 45.  Brief for Ryan T. Anderson, Ph.D., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). 
 46.  Brief for Fam. Rsch. Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). 




Five references. Dignity central to 
the protection of religious belief. 
“This suppression of beliefs would 
diminish the freedom of millions of 
Americans to live their faith openly 
and with dignity”;48 “These beliefs 
about marriage are not going away. 
Cherished by billions of believers 
worldwide and tens of millions in 
the U.S., these doctrines will not 
change based on federal court 
decisions, much less the shifting 
tides of public opinion. They are 
tied to theology, religious and 
family practices, and entire ways of 
life. They are no less essential to the 
dignity and identity of millions of 
Americans than petitioners’ sexual 
orientation is to them.”49 
Religious Organizations, 
Public Speakers and 
Scholars Concerned 
About Free Speech50 
Five references. “Freedom to speak 
according to religious conscience is 
essential to the dignity of each 
person and to the stability of a self-
governing Republic.”51 
Mike Huckabee Policy 
Solutions and Family 
Research Institute52 
One reference. Not central to  
the argument. 
Foundation for  
Moral Law53 
One obiter from Lawrence v. Texas. 
International Conference One reference. Not central to  
 
 47.  Brief for Major Religious Orgs. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). 
 48.  Id. at 29. 
 49.  Id. at 34. 
 50.  Brief for Religious Orgs. et al. Concerned About Free Speech as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562,  
14-571, 14-574). 
 51.  Id. at 31. 
 52.  Brief for Mike Huckabee Pol’y Sols. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). 
 53.  Brief for Found. for Moral L. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). 
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of Evangelical Endorsers54 the argument. 
United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops55 
Four references. “It is not a 
judgment about the dignity or 
worth of any person, married or 
not” (p. 11); “[T]he Church’s 
pastoral care of persons who are 
sexually attracted solely or 
predominantly to persons of the 
same sex is informed not only by its 
teaching about the proper use of the 
sexual faculty, but by its conviction 
that each and every human person, 
regardless of sexual inclination, has 
a dignity and worth that derives 
from his or her Creator”;56 “[E]very 
January, the Nation celebrates the 
birthday of a minister, who drew 
upon decidedly religious and moral 
notions of human dignity in urging 
the reform of American law.”57 
Protectmarriage.com-Yes 
on 8 et. al.58 
One reference. Not central to  
the argument. 
International Conference 
of Evangelical Endorsers59 
One reference. “Absent appropriate 
judicial restraint, nothing prevents 
polygamy, bestiality, or any other 
practice or crime which many 
people currently would call a 
perversion, from becoming a 
constitutional right merely because 
it provides some disaffected group 
meaning, and alleged dignity, and 
 
 54.  Brief for Int’l Conf. of Evangelical Endorsers as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). 
 55.  Brief of U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). 
 56.  Id. at 11 
 57.  Id. at 18. 
 58.  Brief of Protectmarriage.com—Yes on 8 et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). 
 59.  Brief of the Int’l Conf. of Evangelical Endorsers, supra note 54. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:5 (2021) 
1170 
personal fulfillment.”60 
Catholic Answers61 Three references. “The People’s 
desire to preserve the traditional 
definition of marriage is neither 
inspired by animus nor bigotry. It is 
a choice made by informed and 
engaged individuals who seek to 
strike a balance between preserving 
the rights of religious believers 
while also promoting the dignity of 
sexual minorities.”62 
54 International and 
Comparative Law 
Experts from 27 
Countries and the 
Marriage and Family 
Law Research Project63 
Three references. “Leading experts 
have noted the importance of 
protecting religious freedom and 
finding nuanced compromises  
that will afford maximal respect  
to the dignity and freedom of  
all concerned.”64 
Table 2: Relevant References to Dignity  
in the Amicus Briefs Submitted 
 
Dignity in the judgment: Dignity is at the core of the majority 
opinion written by Justice Kennedy. It is therefore possible to find 
several references to the term. The conclusion of the opinion 
summarizes the understanding of dignity in this case adopted by 
Justice Kennedy. According to him, same-sex couples “ask for 
equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them 
that right.”65 This conception of dignity is criticized in the minority 
opinions, especially in Justice Thomas’s dissent. He argues that 
“[t]he government cannot bestow dignity, and it cannot take it 
away.”66 As I have previously underlined, the use of dignity in this 
judgment has been widely commented upon. 
 
 60.  Id. at 26. 
 61.  Brief of Cath. Answers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). 
 62.  Id. at i. 
 63.  Brief for 54 Int’l L. Experts from 27 Countries et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). 
  64.  Id. at 31. 
 65. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 681. 
 66. Id. at 735 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Other religiously inspired organizations submitted amicus 
briefs relevant for the purpose of this study but with no direct 
reference to dignity.67 
2. Oliari v. Italy 
Holding: Italy failed to comply with the positive obligation to 
respect the applicants’ private and family life as the State did not 
provide a legal framework for the recognition and protection of 
their relationship under domestic law.68 
Dignity in the judgment: The only relevant reference to dignity 
in the text of the judgment is made at paragraph 107 where the 
position of the applicants is summarized: “The applicants 
considered that the recognition in law of one’s family life and status 
was crucial for the existence and well-being of an individual and 
for his or her dignity.”69 
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the 
purpose of this study but with no direct reference to dignity.70 
 
 67. See, e.g., Brief for Gen. Conf. of the Seventh Day Adventists et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Neither Party, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-
571, 14-574); Brief for CatholicVote.org Educ. Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574); 
Brief for Nat’l Coal. of Black Pastors & Christian Leaders as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574); 
Brief for Inst. for Marriage & Pub. Pol’y et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (No. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574); Brief for Texas 
Values as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (Nos. 
14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). 
  68.  Oliari v. Italy, App. Nos. 18766/11, 36030/11 (Oct. 21, 2015), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-156265. 
 69. Id. at 107. 
 70. See, e.g., Brief for Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just. as Amici Curiae, Oliari v. Italy, App. Nos. 
18766/11, 36060/11 (2015); Brief for Pavel Parfentev on Behalf of Seven Russian NGOs (Fam. 
& Demography Found. et al.) and Three Ukrainian NGOs (Parental Comm. of Ukraine et al.) 
as Amici Curiae, Oliari v. Italy, App. Nos. 18766/11, 36060/11 (2015). These organizations 
were given leave to intervene by the Vice President of the Chamber, but no submissions were 
received by the court. 
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B. Migration71 
1. Trump v. Hawaii 
Holding: The President has lawfully exercised the discretion 
granted to him under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) to suspend the entry of 
aliens into the United States.72 Respondents did not demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that Presidential 
Proclamation No. 9645 violates the Establishment Clause. 
Dignity in the judgment: There is no reference to arguments 
based on dignity in the judgment. 
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the 
purpose of this study but with no direct reference to dignity.73 
2. F.G. v. Sweden 
Holding: The applicant’s return to Iran would not constitute a 
violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, on account of the 
applicant’s political past in Iran.74 However, for the court there 
would be a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention if  
the applicant were to be returned to Iran without an ex nunc 
assessment by the Swedish authorities of the consequences of his 
religious conversion. 
Dignity in the judgment: There is no reference to arguments 
based on dignity in the judgment. 
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the 
purpose of this study but with no direct reference to dignity.75 
 
 71. For an overview of the relationships between human dignity and migration, see 
Christine M. Venter, Human Dignity Has No Borders: Respecting the Rights of “People on the 
Move” and the Rights and Religious Freedom of Those Who Aid Them, 46 BYU L. REV. 1369 (2021). 
   72.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 73. See, e.g., Brief for Christian Legal Soc’y et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither 
Party, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965); Brief for Found. for Moral L. as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965); 
Brief for Am. Ctr. for L. & Just. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Trump, 138 S. Ct. 
2392 (2018) (No. 17-965); Brief for All. Defending Freedom as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965); Brief for Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 
2392 (2018) (No. 17-965). 
   74.  F.G. v. Sweden, App. No. 43611/11 (Mar. 23, 2016), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-161829. 
 75. See, e.g., Brief for Eur. Center for L. & Just. as Amicus Curiae, F.G. v. Sweden, App. 
No. 43611/11 (2016); Brief for All. Defending Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae, F.G. v. Sweden, 
App. No. 43611/11 (2016). 
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C. Individual Religious Freedom 
1. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission 
Holding: The Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s actions in 
assessing a cakeshop owner’s reasons for declining to make a cake 
for a same-sex couple’s wedding celebration violated the free 
exercise clause.76 Relevant references to dignity in the amicus briefs 
submitted to the Court are available in the table below. 
 
Organizations Reference to Dignity 
Billy Graham Evangelistic 
Association and others77 
One reference quoting from 
Hobby Lobby. Not central to  
the argument. 
United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops and others78 
Six references. Two obiter  
and the other references are  
not direct. 
Becket Fund for  
Religious Liberty79 
Six references. Dignity is 
understood as a foundational 
principle: “The reality is that 
with respect to participation  
in wedding ceremonies,  
dignity is and ought to be a 
two-way street.”80  
 
   76.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
   77.  Brief for Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)  
(No. 16-111). 
   78.  Brief for U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
   79.  Brief for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)  
(No. 16-111). 
   80.  Id. at 3. 
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Christian business  
owners supporting  
religious freedom81 
Twenty-one references. Dignity 
is understood as a key and 
foundational principle: “For 
devout religious citizens, such a 
rule fatally erodes religious 
freedom, freedom of speech, 
protections of property rights, 
and the substantive due process 
of dignity, autonomy, and 
identity”82; “The Court, 
however, did not limit the 
meaning of personal identity to 
only marital and sexual choices, 
but explained that the right 
extends to all personal choices, 
central to one’s dignity and 
autonomy”83; “Although it 
vigorously protected 
Respondents’ ‘dignity’ rights, 
the lower court unfairly 
neglected the same rights by 
Petitioners”84; “It appears 
unwise, at best, to read 
Obergefell’s dignity right as 
bestowing on one group the 
power to coerce compliance by 
another, especially in violation 
of the latter’s free speech and 
religious convictions”85; 
“Whatever the basis of this 
dignity or identity right might 
be, one of its boundaries must 
be that it can compel tolerance 
at most, but it cannot coerce 
another’s endorsement or 
participation, for that would 
constitute a complementary 
infringement of the latter’s 
dignity or identity right”86; “For 
followers of Jesus Christ, 
adhering to His commands is 
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the most personal and central 
choice to define their individual 
dignity and autonomy.”87 
Christian Legal Society88 Three references. “The insult  
or dignitary harm to same-sex 
couples cannot be considered  
in isolation. The Court must 
also consider the dignitary 
harm to religious objectors,  
for whom ‘free exercise is 
essential in preserving their 
own dignity.’”89 
Table 3: Relevant References to Dignity  
in the Amicus Briefs Submitted 
Dignity in the judgment: Dignity is mentioned six times in the 
judgment. It is mentioned to set the framework for the need for 
equal treatment of individuals: “Our society has come to the 
recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as 
social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.” However, no 
real consequence is derived from this general framework. 
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the 
purpose of this study but with no direct reference to dignity.90 
 
   81.  Brief for Christian Bus. Owners Supporting Religious Freedom as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018) (No.16-111). 
   82.  Id. at 10. 
   83.  Id. at 23. 
   84.  Id. at 25. 
   85.  Id. 
   86.  Id. 
   87.  Id. at 32. 
   88.  Brief for Christian Legal Soc’y et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
 89.  Id. at 5 
 90. See, e.g., Brief for Found. for Moral L. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); Brief 
of Amici Council for Christian Colls. & Univs. et al. Supporting Neither Party, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); Brief for Ethics and 
Religious Liberty Comm. of the Southern Baptist Convention et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018) (No. 16-111); Brief for Christian L. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
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2. Lautsi v. Italy91 
Holding: The decision to display crucifixes in the classrooms of 
public schools attended by the applicant’s children was within the 
margin of appreciation left to the respondent State in the context of 
its obligation to respect, in the exercise of the functions it assumes 
in relation to education and teaching, the right of parents to ensure 
such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious 
and philosophical convictions.92 
Dignity in the judgment: In the context of the judgment, 
arguments based on dignity did not play a role and did not 
influence the final outcome. 
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs, relevant for the 
purpose of this study but with no direct reference to dignity.93 
D. Collective Religious Freedom 
1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.  
Holding: As applied to closely held corporations, the 
regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human 
Services requiring employers to provide their female employees 
with no-cost access to contraception violate the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act.94 
Dignity in the judgment: In the context of the majority opinion, 
arguments based on dignity did not play a role and did not 
influence the final outcome. In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Kennedy underlined how  
[i]n our constitutional tradition, freedom means that all persons 
have the right to believe or strive to believe in a divine creator and 
a divine law. For those who choose this course, free exercise is 
essential in preserving their own dignity and in striving for a self-
definition shaped by their religious precepts. Free exercise in this 
sense implicates more than just freedom of belief.95  
 
   91.  Lautsi v. Italy, 30814/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104040. 
 92.  Id. 
 93. See, e.g., Brief for All. Def. Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting Applicants, Lautsi v. 
Italy, 30814/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) (not admitted by the court). 
 94.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 95.  Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
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This understanding of free exercise and its direct link with dignity 
seems to reflect the position of some of the organizations that 
submitted amicus briefs before the Court. 
 
Organizations Reference to Dignity 
Family Research Council96 One reference. Not central  
for the development of  
the argument 
American Center for Law and 
Justice97 
Four references. “Amici urge 
this Court, in its adjudication 
of the issues involved in these 
cases, to be mindful of the 
dignity of individual 
conscience and the right of 
religious exercise our 
forefathers held sacred in the 
founding of this country”98; 
“Whether this country will 
continue to preserve the 
dignity of conscience and 
robustly protect religious 
freedom in the future largely 
depends on how this Court 
rules in the cases at bar”99; 
“While the government may 
not question the sincerity of 
the religious beliefs of 
business owners like Amici, it 
directly questions—in fact, 
seeks to eradicate—their 
ability to run their businesses 
according to these beliefs, 
specifically, on an issue of 
what they believe to be of 
 
   96.  Brief for Fam. Rsch. Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Hobby Lobby  
and Conestoga, et al., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014)  
(Nos. 13-354, 13-356). 
   97.  Brief for Am. Ctr. for L. & Just. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Hobby Lobby et 
al., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356). 
 98.  Id. at 61. 
 99.  Id. at 12. 
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supreme importance: the 
dignity and sanctity of  
human life, in its creation  
and transmission.”100 
Table 4: Relevant References to Dignity  
in the Amicus Briefs Submitted 
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the 
purpose of this study but with no reference to dignity.101 
2. Fernández Martínez v. Spain 
Holding: A Catholic bishop could decide not to renew the 
contract of a teacher of Catholic religion who had joined a public 
campaign to oppose the Catholic Church’s practice of celibacy  
for priests.102 
Dignity in the judgment: No reference to dignity can be found 
in the text of the Grand Chamber judgment. 
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the 
purpose of this study but with no reference to dignity.103 
E. Abortion 
1. Russo v. June Medical Services LLC 
Holding: Louisiana’s Unsafe Abortion Protection Act, requiring 
doctors who perform abortion to have admitting privileges at a 
nearby hospital, is unconstitutional.104 
Dignity in the judgment: No reference to dignity can be found 
in the text of the final majority opinion of the Court. 
 
 100.  Id. at 20. 
 101. See, e.g., Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Evangelicals as Amicus Curiae Supporting Hobby 
Lobby et al., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356); 
Brief for the Knights of Columbus as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Private Parties, Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356). 
 102.  Case of Fernández Martínez v. Spain, 56030/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145068. 
 103. See, e.g., Written Comments of Chair in L. & Religions of the Université catholique 
de Louvain et al. as Third-Party Interveners, Fernández Martínez, 56030/07; Observations 
écrites en tierce intervention du Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just., Fernández Martínez, 56030/07. 
 104.  Russo v. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020). 
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Different organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the 
purpose of this study but with no reference to religion.105 
2. A, B & C v. Ireland 
Holding: Ireland failed to implement the right to a  
legal abortion.106 
Dignity in the judgment: The court did not make use of 
arguments based on dignity to reach its final judgment. The only 
reference to dignity can be found at paragraph 162 of the judgment 
where the requests of the applicants are summarized: “[T]he 
criminalization of abortion was discriminatory (crude stereotyping 
and prejudice against women), caused an affront to women’s 
dignity and stigmatized women, increasing feelings of anxiety. The 
applicants argued that the two options open to women—
overcoming taboos to seek an abortion abroad and aftercare at 
home or maintaining the pregnancy in their situations—were 
degrading and a deliberate affront to their dignity.”107 
Several organizations submitted amicus briefs relevant for the 
purpose of this study but with no reference to dignity.108 
CONCLUSION 
Christian conservative NGOs and public-interest law groups 
have faced important defeats before the U.S. Supreme Court and 
the European Court of Human Rights. They have also seen 
important victories, as is clear from the outcome of the Lautsi case 
decided by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights. The Obergefell decision from the U.S. Supreme Court, on the 
other side, has probably signaled the lowest point of influence for 
religious-based litigation, even though, as we have seen, the 
decision is today criticized also by progressive scholars and 
activists. From the analysis undertaken in this article, and from the 
 
 105. See, e.g., Brief for Am. Ctr. for L. & Just. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent & Cross-Petitioner, Russo v. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (Nos. 18-
1323, 18-1460); Brief for Ams. United for Life as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent & 
Cross-Petitioner, Russo v. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (Nos. 18-1323, 18-1460). 
 106.  A, B & C v. Ireland, 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-102332. 
 107. Id. at 45. 
 108. See, e.g., Written Observations of Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just. as Third-Party Intervener, 
A, B & C v. Ireland, 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010); Written Observations of All. Def. Fund et 
al. as Third-Party Interveners, A, B & C v. Ireland, 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). 
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decisions which have been analyzed, dignity-based arguments 
have not played a key role in the context of the litigation  
strategies or interventions before the European Court of  
Human Rights and the U.S. Supreme Court. It has yet to be seen if 
this trend will be confirmed in the future and if human dignity  
will assume a more important role in strategies to advance legal 
arguments via adjudication. 
With the development of populist approaches to 
constitutionalism, conservative Christian actors have also signaled 
an approach that is critical of international organizations and 
international law. For instance, the European Centre for Law and 
Justice has recently been at the center of a debate on the workings 
of the European Court of Human Rights through the publication of 
a report aimed at showing the supposed bias of the court.109 If a 
populist approach will hegemonize the approach of conservative 
Christians and drive them outside the boundaries of institutional 
trust, it will be difficult for them to provide a significant 
contribution to the development of the role of human dignity in 
adjudication. What will happen to the Christian legal movement, 
and especially to its American core, will be of fundamental 
importance also for future developments in Europe and in the 
world. It seems, as argued by Daniel Bennett, that  
[r]egardless of the Obergefell decision, the Christian legal 
movement is too well funded and organized to simply disappear. 
Armed with million-dollar budgets and attorneys committed to a 
broader cause, Christian conservative legal organizations are not 
built to fade away. Some of its groups may dissolve over time, but 
the broader Christian legal movement is poised for a sustained 
presence on the stage of legal and cultural conflict.110 
But to the development of which notion of dignity will these 
actors contribute? Will they focus their efforts on a truly global 
effort for the promotion of an inclusive notion of human dignity as 
the basis for the protection of human rights? Or will they prefer the 
less inclusive notion aimed at being exploited in the short-term 
scenario of the political cycle? Important guidance to these actors 
may come from the recent encyclical letter that Pope Francis 
released in October 2020. In Fratelli tutti, Pope Francis mentions 
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dignity sixty-six times, but two paragraphs of the document are 
particularly relevant for our analysis.111 In paragraph 8 of the 
encyclical, Pope Francis makes an explicit link between the 
recognition of dignity and the universal aspiration to fraternity: 
It is my desire that, in this our time, by acknowledging the dignity 
of each human person, we can contribute to the rebirth of a 
universal aspiration to fraternity. Fraternity between all men and 
women. . . . Let us dream, then, as a single human family, as 
fellow travelers sharing the same flesh, as children of the same 
earth which is our common home, each of us bringing the richness 
of his or her beliefs and convictions, each of us with his or her own 
voice, brothers and sisters all.112 
In paragraph 22 of the encyclical, a direct connection between 
the protection of human rights and dignity is made: 
It frequently becomes clear that, in practice, human rights are not 
equal for all. Respect for those rights “is the preliminary condition 
for a country’s social and economic development. When the 
dignity of the human person is respected, and his or her rights 
recognized and guaranteed, creativity and interdependence 
thrive, and the creativity of the human personality is released 
through actions that further the common good[.]” Yet, “by closely 
observing our contemporary societies, we see numerous 
contradictions that lead us to wonder whether the equal  
dignity of all human beings, solemnly proclaimed seventy  
years ago, is truly recognized, respected, protected and promoted 
in every situation.”113 
There seems to be the opportunity in litigation to advance an 
inclusive conception of dignity which is not necessarily 
weaponized to continue to pursue culture wars by legal means.114 
The cases analyzed have shown that the degree of attention to the 
topic so far has not been particularly relevant. Therefore, there is 
probably space to continue the conversation and the contribution 
to the development of a jurisprudence built on dignity. Linking 
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dignity to human rights and fraternity, as Pope Francis suggests in 
Fratelli tutti, seems to offer a road full of potential.115 
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